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My contribution is an attempt to resolve one of those enigmas that the French colonial archives hold for assiduous readers. In the course of comparativ research on the juridical status of métis children in the French Empire,1 1 was struck by the frequency with which the terms "dignity" and "prestige" figured in a wide range of colonial preoccupations -whether on the part of local o central administrations, private individuals or institutions. These were not merely personal or social qualities, but terms that had precise legal meanings and that played a central role in colonial jurisprudence. In this context, the terms were predominantly used in the negative -referring to threats to prestige ( atteintes au prestige) or to the obligation to maintain one's dignity (garder sa dignité). This runs counter to the conventional image of a self-confiden colonial society, persuaded of its superiority and of the legitimacy of its "mission civilisatrice." It is also difficult to reconcile with one of the most common representations of colonial domination as founded solely or overwhelmingly on the use of force. In fact, these documents often present the politics of prestige and the unrestrained exercise of force as a contradiction. 2 The insistence on the triad of "dignity," "prestige," and "domination" by colonial administrators and by some members of the indigenous elite obliges us to reconsider -at least in some respects -the view of the colonial state presented in much recent historiography.3 This paper does not aim to propose yet another theory of the colonial state, but rather offers an analysis of some important and overlooked features of colonial practice -especially regarding the legal dimension of imperial rule. It focuses on those French colonial societies in which the division between subjects and citizens played a fundamental role and looks specifically at the period of consolidation of colonial rule which compromise his authority, his prest honor." He reminded them of "the high pr private life of the magistrates" and threate who did not conform to "conduct and priv and respectable."5 Although similar regulat politan France, they remained largely invis as strategically central to the maintenan highly personal conception of power in b ception that historians more readily associa bureaucratic rule. In the colonies, this form stark social cleavage between rulers and sub Métis children were another much remar tige. The spectacle of these half-breeds "go was an anguished subject of literature, the The connection between the imper the policing of racial boundaries is duced by colonial administrators -t cion and control through law were on the colonizers.
The question of prestige and dignity is not limited to the description of sexual intimacy and its consequences. It is also ubiquitous -and here I cite only those archives I know well -in discussions about according citizenship to indigènes, whether at the level of legislative action or in dossiers related to individual requests.
The significance of prestige and dignity as complements of power seems self-evident. Both notions, moreover, were implicated in the concept of the "white man's burden" which, while more developed in British colonial literature than in French, nonetheless became a commonplace in European culture by the end of the nineteenth century. Certain historians of empire later took this ubiquity at face value, seeing the white man's burden -and the forms of behavior it implied -as motives of the imperial projects. This intuitive self-evidence, however, has arguably obscured as much as it has revealed -especially in relation to how the concepts of dignity and prestige functioned and were understood. In many respects, they appear doubly displaced in the French imperial context at the turn of the twentieth century. First is their anachronistic character, suggestive of court society where the logic of honor and the importance accorded to "dignities" were central.8 These norms of aristocratic, pre-bureaucratic provenance survived, much diminished, in nineteenth-century bourgeois society because of their residual role in the long struggle for state power between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. In general, the bourgeoisie preferred the language of "respectability" to that of "prestige. "9 Second is the tension between these concepts and the two main (and This essay will try to illuminate the peculiar structure that made dignity and prestige privileged instruments of colonial domination. Since dignity is an old legal category, dating back to the ancien régime but later revived in French nationality law at the end of the nineteenth century, this investigation requires a detour through an analysis of the role of law in the colonial situation.
The relationship between dignity, prestige and domination was overtly inscribed in the colonial legal order. Prestige played a significant and highly institutionalized role in the repressive apparatus: the different "codes de l'indigénat" -specific repressive regimes that governed the indigènes -all contained articles that specified the punishment of crimes against the prestige of colonial officials. Thus an 1881 decree establishing the "code de l'indigé-nat" in Indochina prohibited the following behaviors: "irreverence or lack of respect toward the administration and civil servants"; and "irreverent comments in the villages directed at the administration, the administrator, and civil servants."12 These were not exceptional measures taken in the uncertain context of conquest. On the contrary, repressive regimes became progressively more elaborate and detailed in the interwar years, and they included increasingly precise descriptions of affronts to colonial prestige. Crystallized in the legal discourse, prestige belonged to the basic conceptual horizon of colonial functionaries. At the same time, the field of "colonial science" in metropolitan France accorded the question of prestige and other forms of charismatic legitimacy a central place in its inquiries into the form of government proper to the colonies. This question was not restricted to the realm of political doctrine but was at the heart of instructions at the École coloniale in the 1920s and 30s. 13 The question of dignity, however, has a slightly different resonance, and it is the triadic relationship between dignity, prestige, and domination that I think warrants more attention here. To begin with, this relationship needs to be understood as part of the central question of late nineteenth-century polit- Balandier's conception of law is ambiguous. First of all, he suggests that -as a scientific field -the law does not contribute to understanding the totality of the colonial situation. Whereas the perspectives of the "historian, economist, politician, administrator, sociologist, and psychologist" all contribute to such an analysis, the perspective of the jurist does not. This is due in large part to what Balandier perceives as the deep implication of the law in the colonial situation: law is an ideology that justifies the colonial system. In this context, Balandier cites Jules Harmand's Domination and Colonization (1910) -a text whose reasoning and categories of thought are eminently juridical and which was one of the most frequently cited manifestos of the doctrine of association. As a discipline, the law participates in the "inauthentic character" of the colonial situation, insofar as it furnishes "pseudo-reasons for its justification."21 This characterization clearly reflects Balandier's interest in Marxism and also suggests in part why French colonial historians evinced so little interest in juridical phenomena. Nonetheless, Balandier argues that although the law is discredited as a scientific perspective, it remains an important object of analysis. This is an unexploited but, in my view, crucial point. Law, in colonial science, was absolutely central to the production of French doctrines on how to manage the colonies and maintain colonial domination. It also figured centrally in international exchanges on these questions and above all in the training of colonial administrators. 22 If other disciplines such as ethnography gained a prominent place in the period -especially during the interwar years -they maintained a close relationship with law, to the point of sharing problematics and concepts. Until the end of the 1940s, law was the central discipline in the training of colonial administrators. This was visible in the evolution of the curriculum at the École coloniale, which consisted mostly of adding aspects of customary law to the core curriculum of coursework in French law, taken at the Faculté de Droit de Paris. In spite of this prominence in the colonial production of knowledge, the contribution of juridical science to colonial science remains largely unexplored to this day -especially in comparison to anthropology. This imbalance is the result of a certain "ethnocentrism of disciplines": social scientists in the past thirty years have shown almost inexhaustible interest in the role of anthropology and ethnography in the colonial situation. In part, this can be attributed to the strong tendency of those disciplines to reflect on the practice and status of their inquiries -a quality found only rarely in the study of law. In part, it follows from the tendency within these disciplines to overestimate the social and political significance of their enterprise. Finally, one can point to the institutional divide between the social sciences and law, and more specifically to the marginal status of legal history -particularly in France.
Despite the ideological function that Balandier accords the science of law in the colonial situation, he recognizes the crucial role the legal order played in defining it. Consequently, he su tions. First, he describes the rule o advantage of the colonial society" a between two other modes -mate concept of the rule of law allows and superstructure. Today a com French concept of État de droit ha man jurisprudence, where it desi laws that define it or, on the con superior to, and often a constrain gained acceptance in western dem tions after World War II. French le century, however, was concerned a assessing new democratic challenge legal scholars, the rule of law appe serves as the privileged instrument majority and parliamentary omnip modality -the rule of law as an exported to the colonies.
The second function of the law as a social institution in Balandieťs text is to guarantee that the society of the colonizers remained segregated from that of the colonized. Law was a privileged means by which "the group [of colonizers] renders itself untouchable by keeping contacts to a bare minimum."25 This closure and distance, he argued further, were the conditions of the "politics of domination and prestige" -notions whose relationship Balandier takes as self-evident. Segregation is also based on a "system whose fundamental justification is basically racial," and whose importance, Balandier suggests, has been substantively neglected by colonial anthropologists. Racial phenomena, like juridical matters, operate on two levels: they profoundly structure the colonial order and then play a part in the a posteriori ideological justification of that order.
In his analysis, Balandier has frequent recourse to the work of René Mau- Paris. Because students at the École coloniale had to pursue a degree in law at this school as part of their training, most of them were probably exposed to his teaching. Maunier's interest in the transformations of Islamic law in Algeria in the course of colonization26 led him to conceptualize a broader imperial legal structure that would encompass the laws of metropolitan France, indigenous legal systems, and the new norms produced by the need to regulate the colonial encounter. In the enormous, three-volume synthesis of his coursework and research, Colonial Sociology (published between 1932 and 1942), he insists -as Balandier notes -that the "contact between the races" is the constitutive element of the colonial experience. But Balandier does not specif that, for Maunier, this contact between the races is above all contact between the laws ("contact de droit"). Fundamentally, in Maunieťs analyses, coloniza tion is the exportation of a system of law. Without this element, the colonizers would have the status of immigrants subject to local norms -constituting a colonie or settlement, in the older meaning of the word in French. De facto domination, in other words, requires de jure domination.27 Only then, Maunier suggests, can it be described as the exercise of sovereignty by a central state over a colony. Only through law can domination be extended over time.
In other words, it seems that the governmentality/sovereignty couplet offers little help in explaining the colonial legal apparatus -despite its cen trality to much of the recent work on the colonial state. The distinction between the two is most often borrowed from Michel Foucault: in this context, "sovereignty" refers to an older means of exercising power exemplified by the promulgation of "law" from a single source; "governmentality," i contrast, is a more supple regime of regulation of the behavior of a populatio via disciplines and "standards," which displace the rule of law. The latte mode of domination is produced from multiple sources and is no longer t singular exercise of power.28 In the Empire, the legal order combined the im perative of governing the indigènes with an ever-present preoccupation with maintaining the sovereignty of the metropolitan state over the colonizers. It is the latter that illuminates the relationship between "dignity," "prestige and colonial domination.
Law As the Instrument of a Two-Fold Colonial Domination
The process of colonization was continually traversed by law and legal str tures. Far from being a pure exercise of force, colonization involved divers els of codification and, at the same time, was necessarily responsive to div juridical contingencies. Because colonization was also a Europe-wide pr international law played an increasing role in settling disputes between im rial nations. International law, in this context, drew initially on studies o ereignty -in particular those of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and Jo Locke in the seventeenth century.29 By the end of the nineteenth centur course, the question had less to do with justifying possession and dominat to the populations of newly acquired territories than with justifying it to pean partners who were engaged in a competition for colonies. This comp tion required rules -a need ultimately met by the League of Nations ( which asserted the "sacred mission of civilization" that defined the duties of "greater peoples" to "lesser peoples. colonists -a subject well known to colonial historians and mentioned by Balandier. The larger issue of "control at a distance" became the immediate problem of local representatives of the state, whose efforts were often not well received by the colonists themselves. The local administration's systemati practice of maintaining dossiers on colonists was one of these practices. 41 Despite the efforts of some writers, it would be absurd to limit discussion of colonial legal doctrine to the question of sovereignty over the colonizers - In practice, legal statuses were t through the mediation of the set of citizens enjoyed approximately the sa pole, French subjects were governed often limited to a right of consult were subjected to the various "cod regimes imposed by the administra and were in obvious and often brutal contradiction to liberal and democratic ideals. 43 Finally, subjects were governed -especially in their private interactions -by forms of local customary law that were more or less consistent with precolonial norms. The significance of these project of segregation is clear if we think of "Code civil" played in the unification of Fr tion.44 It would be a mistake to think that th represented a space of freedom left to the ind for their norms, as certain colonial jurists sug trary, customary laws were largely defined a tors and magistrates. 45 The social distance that colonial law prod stantly undermined by contact between th between colonizer and colonized guaranteed th systems operated in a dynamic setting. Per and colonized produced not only métis but all those individuals who mediated between the colonizer's and colonized societies -a layer known as the "evolved" (évolués).46 Economic and affective relations also implied communication and exchange between the juridical systems -though this involved far more changes to customary law than t French law. In addition, legal statuses and systems of norms were in no way fixed at the outset of colonization, nor were they static. No clearly predetermined project existed at the legal level. Rather, legal statuses were the result of a collective work of boundary production -above all locally, taking int account the specificity of each colonial situation -and continually renewe and reinvented. Nonetheless, between the late nineteenth century and World War II, there was a tendency to solidify legal statuses and juridical system This can be attributed to the increasingly menacing contestation of the colonial order -especially visible in Indochina but perceptible elsewhere -and to a juridical sphere that had progressively armed itself with categories and pro cedures for thinking about the legal classification of individuals in the coloni setting. For example, it was only in the late 1920s that the legal status of the métis began to be clarified -resulting in a series of decrees (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) In the terms of the July 25, 1864 decree, the Asi Chinese, the Cambodians, the Minh-Huongs, t the Stiengs, the half-breeds (Malays from Ch races are subject to French law. 51 As this passage shows -in one of the very rar word "race" to designate human groups previ legal statuses and the juridical systems the divisions that were essential to the "colonia "citizen" and "subject" are almost exactly s gories of French and indigène, defined in t identity. The extremely rare examples of ind tus -less than 40 a year in the interwar peri token gestures of republican ideology and sho tain legal trajectories were strictly impossibl a subject. It is on this basis that we can un the contact between the races as a contact between laws. As a German administrator observed with regard to law in French West Africa: "legal status is the law proper to each person as a function of their race." 53 If the equivalence between race and law exists, it is because the category of race never functioned as a pure biological fact. This is not the place to undertake a history of the uses of race in colonial settings. However, it is clear that these were strongly marked by republican scientism, itself inspired by physical anthropology. Late nineteenth-century republican thought, in this context, revolved not around "technical" or "scientific" notions of race, but around the idea of "historical races."54 One of the major vectors of influence was Hippolyte Taine, whose extensive use of the terms "race," "milieu," and "moment" in his analyses of national literatures figured centrally in the heavily literary education of most jurists. Taine's work -itself strongly rooted in evolutionism -envisaged cultural production as dependent on the combined influences of race and milieu. Social Darwinism was another venue for the evolutionist paradigm in legal theory. Although I will not take the time here to map out this genealogy, the way forward to a notion of "one race, one law," is clear: each race evolves at its own speed in a given physical milieu. Each produces a civilization, and, as part of it, a legal system. At any given time, race strongly conditions individuals and determines the legal norms that they can "naturally" adopt. This multifaceted linkage between race and law explains, in part, why assimilation receded beyond a distant historical horizon. It is also the rationale for the inflexibility of statuses: juridical systems impose themselves on indi-viduals. Thus, in the colonies, the F tomary law over the Civil Code, e
Islam.55 By the same token, the pas an exceptional favor, granted onl themselves capable of escaping th law. This conception of law as an en durée by each civilization (i.e., by e als -is at odds with the revolutiona entirely consistent with the notion régime, which understood law as th its sovereignty over its subjects.56 reinvigorated by the colonial jurist tomary law. From this perspectiv subject to the sovereignty of the became nothing more than the cust the indigènes through their tradi the colonizers' society at a distance were two sides of the same coin.
Governing Oneself to Dominate the Indigènes and Governing the Indigènes to Dominate Oneself
To come full circle, this set of static relationships between race, civilization and law, on the one hand, and between personal status and sovereignty, on the other, unlocks the logic of the relationship between dignity, prestige, and domination. Maintaining sovereignty and control at a distance over the French population implied a thorough application of the Civil Code. In the colonies, the Civil Code entailed a complex notion of French civility, civilization and ultimately race. The colonial legal order, consequently, had to prevent deviance from certain codes of behavior that were thought central to The idea of an authority-power, the idea of an au aristocratic tradition. 60 The importance of prestige in dominating the indigènes is thus entirely contiguous with the question of maintaining French sovereignty over its overseas colonists. It is by no means clear, moreover, that the question of governing the indigènes comes first. Some colonial theorists reversed the notion: not only must one dominate oneself in order to dominate others, one must govern others in order to govern the self. As Maunier argues:
One must govern in order to govern oneself: one must master in order to master oneself. It is in this sense that de Vogue and Lyautey argued that the chief virtue of expansion was that it hardened [retremper] men, reforging the bastardized character of today's Frenchmen through danger.61
In this sense, colonization implies a work on the self. Just às the civilizing process described by Norbert Elias implied first the transformation of the dominators, the "mission civilisatrice" implied the relentless civilizing of the Finally, this framework allows us t dignity and its connection to prest defined by the "inalienable" natur institutions: thus one spoke in the an or the "dignity of the crown" to sig these functions were only temporary not freely alter its qualities or po escaped individual liberty. It was th status that the bearer had to perform those rules that individuals cannot su interactions; these are the most fund
Colonial juridical doctrine developed posed of the norms thought essent colonial state.67 Thus while custom number of local practices were consi assure "respect for personality and h banned human sacrifice, the chiefs r jects, forms of anthropophagy and s and the slave trade.69 Public order also constrained the colonizers: because French prestige was considered one of the crucial elements of colonial domination, any behavior that diminished that prestige was contrary to it. In this sense, dignity in the colonies can be understood as an extension of the concept of the dignity of an office developed during the ancien régime -a hypothesis that rests on the longue durée of legal categories even across major political and social transformations.70 For this reason, certain forms of behavior that belonged to zones of the private sphere left to individual liberty in the metropole became matters of public order in the colonies. The French could no longer freely dispose of certain formerly personal capacities or choiceswhence Delavignette's notion of "inabdicable dignity."71 For example, the fraudulent recognition of children -a practice that metropolitan justice studiously ignored in the name of the "family peace and repose"-was unaccept-able in the colonies. It was said to call into status/' because through such recognition the citizenship to a colonial subject -a preroga resulted in modifications to the Civil Code in possibility of the prosecution of fraudulent r justice, a practice explicitly forbidden in m thus functioned as an abstract juridical per imposed on the concrete individuals who which implied the performance of a certain ro origin of the word person, which designates it is in this sense, I would argue, that one cou work, Black Skin , White Masks.
Conclusion
The goal of these remarks has been to understand why the concepts of d and prestige carried such weight in the colonial situation. I have tried to how they were deeply implicated in a dialectic that related the sover over the colonists to the governance of the indigènes. This conceptua was framed by old legal categories -in many instances dating back ancien régime. Among them, the notions of dignity and prestige sugges the debate about the "modernity" of the imperial age is somewhat mispl it matters very little to know whether colonies have been the laboratory modern forms of government or the evil by-product of modernity. In th it is the idea of "modern rule" that perhaps needs to be problematized.
Moreover, the "dignity-prestige-domination" triad suggests ways of ing about the continuities between colonial dominance and the metro state. To take up the question of individual status in the French case, it that, beyond the republican rhetoric of the civic pact and the plebiscite,"73 national identity equally implied an "inalienable" aspec concept of dignity played an important (and to this day largely over role in metropolitan discourse on national identity -including in the na ality law of 1889, which became the legal framework for national identi more than a century. In this sense, the colonial situation, far from bein aberration from the French civic model of national identity (as many Fr social scientists would have it even today), allows us to understand more the multiple forms of subjection at work in the "metropolitan situation , and despite the fact that the nationalization of French society was indisputably a long-term process, it is clear that nationalization and national unity were analyzed with unequaled acuity in the last third of the nineteenth century by intellectuals of all republican stripes (notably Renan and Durkheim) as well as by the institutions that undertook to produce that unity (education, the army, and also the legal system, especially the new laws pertaining to nationality). 
